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JOHN MARSHALL,
REVOLUTIONIST MALGRE LUI
Edward S. Corwin t
In the final chapter but one of his biography of Marshall, Bev-
eridge characterizes the aging Marshall as "the Supreme Conservative."
Yet when Marshall first emerged on the national scene it was as a
revolutionist in the fullest sense, and 106 years after his death, it was
Marshall's version of the Constitution which supplied the constitutional
basis for the most profound revolution in the history of our constitu-
tional law. In this paper I shall deal briefly with the intervening
story-the story, to wit, of the evolution of the federal concept in the
thinking of the Supreme Court. But first some personal facts about
Marshall himself.1
John Marshall was born September 24, 1755, on what was then
the western frontier of the British province of Virginia. His father,
Thomas Marshall, was a man of no pretensions to birth or learning,
but of great energy of spirit and strong good sense. To him the Chief
Justice was wont to attribute all his success in life, and it is evident
that between father and son not only a powerful natural affection
existed, but a remarkable congeniality.
With the outbreak of the Revolution, the two Marshalls set about
training their frontier neighbors in the manual of arms. At about the
time that his cousin, Thomas Jefferson, his elder by 12 years, was
drafting the Declaration of Independence, young John was enlisting in
the Continental line. First as lieutenant, later as captain, he fought at
Brandywine, Germantown, Monmouth, and Stoney Point, and under-
went with customary cheerfulness the rigors of Valley Forge.
Referring to this period many years later, he wrote: "I was con-
firmed in the habit of considering America as my country and Congress
as my government." Atiother factor which contributed to his early
nationalistic bent was the influence of the revered Washington.
His regiment's term of enlistment having run out, John, in 1780,
attended, for about one month, a course of lectures on law by the
famed Chancellor Wythe at the College of William and Mary-the only
institutional education he ever received. His self-instruction in the
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law had, however, begun some years earlier with his reading of the
first American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries (1772), to which
his father was a subscriber.
Marshall began legal practice in 1783 in the new state capital at
Richmond and married the same year. His advancement, both pro-
fessional and political, was rapid once it got under way. Meantime his
political creed was taking shape. As a member of the Virginia As-
sembly, off and on from 1782, Marshall came to form a poor opinion
of state legislatures. It seemed to him that generally they had an ex-
aggerated conception of their own powers and that the selfish desires
and narrow outlook of the farmer-debtor class usually controlled their
proceedings. They refused to meet the obligations of their states under
the Articles of Confederation, set at naught certain provisions of the
Treaty of Peace, interfered freely with judicial decisions at the behest
of litigating interests, put difficulties in the way of commerce among
the sister states, voted cheap money laws, and played ducks and drakes
generally with private contracts.
And for once his unloved and unloving cousin Jefferson agreed
with him. In his Notes on Virginia., written in 1781, Jefferson assailed
the Virginia Constitution of 1776 for having produced a concentration
of power in the legislative assembly which answered to "precisely the
definition of despotic government." Nor did it make any difference,
he continued, that such powers were vested in a numerous body "chosen
by ourselves"; "one hundred and seventy-three despots" were "as
oppressive as one"; and "an elective despotism was not the government
we fought for, but one which should not only be founded on free prin-
ciples, but in which the powers of government should be so divided and
balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could
transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and re-
strained by the others." 2
The remedy for the shortsightedness and irresponsibility of the
state legislatures was ultimately supplied by a second revolution, that
which culminated in the adoption of the Constitution; and to this
revolution, too, Marshall lent a helping hand in its later stages. It was
owing mainly to Marshall that the Virginia legislature submitted the
Constitution to the ratifying convention of that state without hamper-
ing instructions. On the floor of the convention itself, Marshall gave
his greatest attention to the judiciary article as it appeared in the pro-
posed Constitution, espousing the idea of judicial review. If, said he,
Congress "make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated,
it would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the Con-
2. 3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 223-24 (Ford ed. 1894).
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stitution which they are to guard. They would not consider such a
law as coming within their jurisdiction. They would declare it void." '
In 1799 Marshall made his once celebrated defense of President
Adams' action in handing over to the British authorities, in conformity
with the Jay Treaty, one Jonathon Robbins, who was allegedly a fugi-
tive from justice. This was one speech on the floors of Congress
which demonstrably made votes. Meantime, in 1797, Marshall had
been one of the famous XYZ mission to France. He successively re-
fused appointment as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and as
Secretary of War, but in 1800 accepted the post of Secretary of State.
On January 22, 1801, while still holding that office, he was nominated
to be Chief Justice and received the Senate's hesitant approval on Janu-
ary 27. The story of this crucial moment in his life and in the history
of American constitutional law is related by Marshall in the Auto-
biographical Sketch which he prepared for Story in 1827:
"On the resignation of Chief Justice Ellsworth I recommended
Judge Patteson [sic] as his successor. The President objected to
him, and assigned as his ground of objection that the feelings of
Judge Cushing would be wounded by passing him and selecting a
junior member of the bench. I never heard him assign any other
objection to Judge Patteson. . . . The President himself men-
tioned Mr. Jay, and he was nominated to the senate. When I
waited on the President with Mr. Jay's letter declining the ap-
pointment he said thoughtfully 'Who shall I nominate now' ?
I replied that I could not tell, as I supposed that his objection to
Judge Patteson remained. He said in a decided tone 'I shall not
nominate him.' After a moments hesitation he said 'I believe
I must nominate you.' I had never before heard myself named
for the office and had not even thought of it. I was pleased as
well as surprized, and bowed in silence. . . . I was unfeignedly
gratified at the appointment, and have had much reason to be
so." 4
Marshall's assumption of the Chief Justiceship marks the begin-
ning of his career as the "Supreme Conservative." Henceforth all
his abilities would be directed to advancing through the Court the
principles which underlay the Constitution, as he understood them, and
these abilities were of a high order. Even Justice Holmes, while de-
murring to Senator Lodge's estimate of Marshall as "a nation-maker,
a state-builder," conceded him, a bit condescendingly to be sure, "a
strong intellect, a good style, personal ascendancy in his court, courage,
justice and the convictions of his party." 5 Two things Holmes
3. 1 BEvERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 452 (1944).
4. MARSHALL, AuTOBIOGRAPHICAL SEETCH 29-30 (Adams ed. 1937).
5. LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 384 (1943).
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omitted: a profound conviction of calling and a singular ability, in the
words of a contemporary, to "put his own ideas into the heads of
others without their knowing it"-the residue, one may surmise, of
his youthful experience as nurse-maid to a whole squadron of younger
brothers and sisters.
The chief canons of Marshall's interpretation of the Constitution
were the juristic weapons by which that interpretation became law of
the land. For the purposes of this paper, they may be briefly sum-
marized as follows:
1. The finality of the Court's interpretation of the law, and hence
of the Constitution, which was the backbone of the doctrine of judicial
review, as set forth particularly in Marbury v. Madison ' in relation to
acts of Congress, and in Cohens v. Virginia 7 in relation to state laws
and constitutional provisions.
2. The popular origin of the Constitution, and its continuous vi-
tality. The Constitution was "designed to endure for ages to come
and hence to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." The
terms in which it grants power to the national government must, there-
fore, be liberally construed. The locus classicus of these doctrines is
Marshall's decision in 1819 in McCulloch v. Maryland.'
3. The principle of national supremacy, which amounted to neither
more nor less than a literal application of article VI, paragraph 2
of the Constitution: "This Constitution and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof and the treaties made
or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding." This language, Marshall held, ruled out
ab initio any idea that the coexistence of the states and their powers
imposed limits on national power. The locus classicus of this doctrine
is the following passage from his great opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden,9
where the scope of Congress' power to regulate commerce afforded
the immediate issue:
"We are now arrived at the inquiry-what is this power?
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested
in congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are pre-
6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
7. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1821).
8. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
9. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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scribed in the constitution. These are expressed in plain terms,
and do not affect the questions which arise in this case, or which
have been discussed at the bar. If, as has always been under-
stood, the sovereignty of congress, though limited to specified
objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, is vested in
congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government,
having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise
of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States.
The wisdom and the discretion of congress, their identity with
the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at
elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for ex-
ample, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have
relied to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on
which the people must often rely solely, in all representative
governments." "0
Even, however, before Marshall had ascended the bench, the
groundwork had been laid for a radically different conception of the
union, viz. that of a union of sovereign states, whose reserved powers,
recognized in amendment X, stood on a footing of equality with the
delegated powers of the general government. The first adumbration
of such a conception appears in Federalist #39, the author of which
was James Madison, and it was further elaborated and extended in
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799. It is hardly
surprising, therefore, that as Marshall proceeded to develop his na-
tionalizing principles, "the sleeping spirit of Virginia, if indeed it may
ever be said to sleep," was aroused to protest.
Approaching Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland from
the angle of his quasi-parental concern for "the balance between the
States and the National Government," Madison declared its central
vice to be that it treated the powers of the latter as "sovereign powers,"
a view which must inevitably "convert a limited into an unlimited
government," for, he continued, "in the great system of political
economy, having for its general object the national welfare, everything
is related immediately or remotely to every other thing; and, con-
sequently, a power over any one thing, if not limited by some obvious
and precise affinity, may amount to a power over every other." "The
very existence," he urged, "of the local sovereignties" was "a control
on the pleas for a constructive amplification of the powers of the Gen-
eral Government." "'
10. Id. at 196-97. See also id. at 210-11.
11. 3 LErERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMEs MADISON 143-47 (1865). For a
more elaborate statement of the same position, see Hugh Swinton Legar 's review in
1829 of the first volume of Kent's Commentaries. 2 WRaIINGs oF HUGS SWINTON
LEGARL 102, 123-33 (M. Legar6 ed. 1845).
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Two more drastic critics were friends of Jefferson and constantly
stimulated by him. One of these was John Taylor of Caroline, who
pronounced Marshall's doctrines to be utterly destructive of the divi-
sion of powers between the two centers of government; the other was
Spencer Roane, Chief Judge of the Virginia Court of Appeals, who
denied that the national government derived any "constructive powers"
from the supremacy clause.' The designated constitutional agencies
for the application of this clause, he argued, were the state judiciaries-
"the judges in every state," to wit. In combatting this heresy Marshall
composed one of his most powerful opinions, that in Cohens v. Vir-
ginia. 3
And many coarser voices joined in the hue and cry, and not
without effect. Hardly any session of Congress convened after 1821,
but witnessed some effort to curtail the powers of the Court, and the
support accorded some of these in Congress reached sizeable propor-
tions. Marshall became increasingly aware that he was fighting a
losing fight.
"To men who think as you and I do," he wrote Story, toward
the end of 1834, "the present is gloomy enough; and the future
presents no cheering prospect. In the South . . . those who
support the Executive do not support the Government. They sus-
tain the personal power of the President, but labor incessantly
to impair the legitimate powers of the Government. Those who
oppose the rash and violent measures of the Executive . . . are
generally the bitter enemies of Constitutional Government. Many
of them are the avowed advocates of a league; and those who do
not go the whole length, go a great part of the way. What can
we hope for in such circumstances?" '4
Marshall died July 5, 1835. A few months later Justice Henry
Baldwin published his View of the Constitution, in which he paid
tribute to his late Chief Justice's qualities as expounder of the Con-
stitution. "No commentator," he wrote, "ever followed the text more
faithfully, or ever made a commentary more accordant with its strict
intention and language. . . . He never brought into action the powers
of his mighty mind to find some meaning in plain words . . . above
the comprehension of ordinary minds. . . . He knew the framers
of the Constitution, who were his compatriots"; he was himself the
historian of its framing, wherefore, as its expositor, "he knew its
objects, its intentions." Yet in the face of these admissions, Baldwin
12. Taylor's and Roane's quarrel with Marshall may be traced sufficiently in the
entries in the index to Beveridge's biography of Marshall. 4 BEVFRDGE, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 657, 662.
13. See also Martin v. Hunter's Lesee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816).
14. CoRwiN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 195.
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rejects Marshall's theory of the origin of the Constitution and the
corollary doctrine of liberal construction. "The history and spirit
of the times," he wrote, "admonish us that new versions of the Con-
stitution will be promulgated to meet the varying course of political
events or aspirations of power." '5
Baldwin's prophecy was speedily justified by the event. Within
twenty-two months following Marshall's demise, the Court, having
been enlarged by Congress from seven to nine Justices with the inten-
tion of watering down the still persisting Marshallian virus, received
five new Justices and a new Chief Justice. Volume 11 of Peters' Re-
ports reflects the juristic result of its transformation. Here occur
three cases involving state laws, all of which, by Story's testimony, the
late Chief Justice had stigmatized as unconstitutional. In 11 Peters all
three are sustained. For present purposes the most significant of
these cases was New York v. Miln,'6 in which it was alleged that the
state, in imposing certain requirements upon captains of vessels enter-
ing New York harbor with aliens aboard, had violated applicable
congressional legislation. Speaking for the Court, Justice Barbour
said:
"There is, then, no collision between the law in question, and
the acts of congress just commented on. . . . But we do not
place our opinion on this ground. We choose rather to plant
ourselves on what we consider impregnable positions. They are
these: That a state has the same undeniable and unlimited juris-
diction over all persons and things, within its territorial limits, as
any foreign nation; where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or
restrained by the constitution of the United States. That, by
virtue of this, it is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn
duty of a state, to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity
of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and
every act of legislation, which it may deem to be conducive to
these ends; where the power over the particular subject, or the
manner of its exercise is not surrendered or restrained, in the
manner just stated. That all those powers which relate to merely
municipal legislation, or what may, perhaps, more properly be
called internal police, are not thus surrendered or restrained; and
that, consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a state is
complete, unqualified and exclusive." I
Although Justice Wayne subsequently alleged that he had never
assented to Barbour's "impregnable positions," and strongly hinted
that they had been smuggled into the Court's opinion after it had
15. Id. at 225-26.
16. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
17. Id. at 139.
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been approved by the other Justices, there can be no doubt that by the
time of the decision of the License Cases,"8 ten years later, Barbour's
dictum had, to all intents and purposes, become settled doctrine of
the Court. What is more, Chief Justice Taney's opinion in these
same cases projects on the basis of it a new conception of the Court's
role in the Constitution, one which he later reiterates and enlarges in
his opinion in Ableman v. Booth, 9 decided in 1858. Here the Su-
preme Court, which Marshall had regarded as primarily an organ for
the maintenance of national supremacy, is depicted as an arbiter stand-
ing outside of and above both the general government and the states,
with power to settle "with the calmness and deliberation of judicial
inquiry" all controversies as to their respective powers-controversies
which "in other countries have been determined by the arbitrament of
force." o Ironically enough, two years later, the Civil War broke.
We move now into a new cycle of American constitutional law.
The Civil War had settled the most urgent and dangerous issue of
the federal relationship. A new problem had meantime arisen-that of
the relation of government, and especially of the national government,
to private enterprise. The problem was formulated in the first instance
in the terminology of the laissez faire conception of governmental
function.
The bare facts of life, and especially the country's dependence upon
the uncurbed energies of its pioneers for the conquest and appropria-
tion of a vast wilderness, rendered American soil fertile ground for
the laissez faire ideology. Thus President Van Buren, in his special
message to Congress of September 4, 1837, wrote:
"All communities are apt to look to government for too much.
Even in our own country, where its powers and duties are so
strictly limited, we are prone to do so, especially at periods of
sudden embarrassment and distress. But this ought not to be.
The framers of our excellent Constitution and the people who ap-
proved it with calm and sagacious deliberation acted at the time
on a sounder principle. They wisely judged that the less govern-
ment interferes with private pursuits the better for the general
prosperity. It is not its legitimate object to make men rich or to
repair by direct grants of money or legislation in favor of par-
ticular pursuits losses not incurred in the public service. This
would be substantially to use the property of some for the benefit
of others. But its real duty-that duty the performance of which
makes a good government the most precious of human blessings
-is to enact and enforce a system of general laws commensurate
18. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
19. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
20. Id. at 520-21.
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with, but not exceeding, the objects of its establishment, and to
leave every citizen and every interest to reap under its benign
protection the rewards of virtue, industry, and prudence." 21
But the theory of laissez faire which dominated the thinking of
the American Bar Association, founded in 1878, and in due course that
of the Supreme Court, was a highly pretentious, highly complex con-
struction which, in effect, presented the American people overnight,
as it were, with a new doctrine of Natural Law-one which thrust
the maintenance of economic competition into the status of a preferred
constitutional value.' Of the distinguishable elements of the theory,
the oldest was a benefaction from Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations,
which assumed a natural "economic order" whose intrinsic principles
or "laws" automatically assure realization of the social welfare, pro-
vided their operation is not interfered with by judgments which are
not based on the self-interest of the author thereof. This famous work
appeared the same year as the Declaration of Independence, a coinci-
dence which a president of the Association opined could only have had
its origin in the mind of Deity itself. In 1857, John Stuart Mill's
Political Economy presented the world with a revised version of the
Wealth of Nations, and was followed two years later by Darwin's
world-shattering Origin of Species. As elaborated particularly by
Herbert Spencer and his American disciple, John Fiske, the evolu-
tionary conception immensely reinforced the notion of governmental
passivity. It was certainly reassuring to know that competition in
the economic world was matched by "the struggle for existence" in
the biological world, and that those who survived the latter struggle
were invariably "the fittest," since that went to show that those who
were most successful in economic competition were likewise "the
fittest." Nor may mention be omitted of Sir Henry Maine's Ancient
Law, which appeared two years after the Origin of Species, for here
the evolutionary process received, so to speak, a sort of jural sanctifica-
tion. "The movement of progressive societies," wrote Maine, "has
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract." If hitherto, then
why not henceforth? Freedom of contract, too, was a part of the divine
plan.
To return to the American Bar Association-its original mem-
bership comprised avowedly the glite of the American bar. Organized
in the wake of the decision in Munn v. Illinois,' which one of the
members opined was a sign that the country was "gravitating toward
21. 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF MARTIN VAN BuR-iN 344 (Richardson ed. 1897).
22. See Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTIoN 63-200 (1942).
23. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
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barbarism," the Association soon became a sort of juristic sewing
circle for mutual education in the gospel of laissez faire. Addresses
and papers presented at the annual meetings iterated and reiterated
the tenets of the new creed: government was essentially of private
origin; the police power of the state was intended merely to implement
the common law of nuisance; the right to fix prices was no part of
any system of free government; "in the progress of society there is a
natural tendency to freedom"; the trend of democracy is always away
from regulation in the economic field; "the more advanced a nation
becomes, the more will the liberty of the individual be developed."
What, however, did this signify practically? This question was
answered by the president of the Association in 1892, in these words:
"Can I be mistaken in claiming that Constitutional Law is the most
important branch of American jurisprudence; and that the American
Bar is and should be in a large degree that priestly tribe to whose hands
are confided the support and defense of the Ark of the Covenant of
our fathers . . .?" '
The problem remained, nevertheless, of how the tenets of laissez
faire were to be translated into the accepted idiom of American con-
stitutional law? This problem was met in part by Association papers,
in part also by contemporary writings on constitutional law, such as,
notably, Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Tiedeman's Treatise on
the Limitations of the Police Power, James Coolidge Carter's Law, Its
Origin, Growth and Function, John Forrest Dillon's The Laws and
Jurisprudence of England and America, among others.
And the final grist of all this grinding for the constitutional law
of the period was, first, the doctrine of freedom of contract and,
secondly, the doctrine that the regulation of production is exclusively
reserved to the states both by the tenth amendment and by the prin-
ciple of federal equilibrium. The doctrine of freedom of contract owes
most to Tiedeman, who advanced the proposition that when a court
w~s confronted with a statute restrictive of freedom of contract in the
economic field, the principle that statutes are to be presumed constitu-
tional was automatically repealed and the burden of proof was shifted
to anyone who pleaded the statute.
The concept of freedom of contract is, of course, post-Marshall,
being an offshoot of the substantive doctrine of due process of law,
which first received important recognition in the jurisprudence of the
Court in Chief Justice Taney's opinion in the Dred Scott case.25. It
24. See CORWiN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 87-88 (1941); Twiss, op.
cit. supra note 22, at 174-200.
25. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857). For the antecedents
of this dictum, see CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 58-115 (1948).
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reached its culmination in the October term of 1935 when the Court de-
clared in et~ect that a minimum wage law was beyond the competence
of either the states or the national government 26 For our purpose
we need give this concept no further attention. The other doctrine,
however, that of an exclusive state power in the field of production,
is immediately pertinent to the purpose of this paper.
The first important case in which this doctrine played a decisive
role was the famed Sugar Trust case 27 of 1895, in which the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act was put to sleep for twenty years so far as its main
purpose, the repression of industrial combinations, was concerned.
Early in his opinion, Chief Justice Fuller stated the fundamental ra-
tionale of the decision as follows:
"It is vital that the independence of the commercial power
and of the police power, and the delimitation between them, how-
ever sometimes perplexing, should always be recognized and ob-
served, for while the one furnishes the strongest bond of union,
the other is essential to the preservation of the autonomy of the
States as required by our dual form of government; and acknowl-
edged evils, however grave and urgent they may appear to be,
had better be borne, than the risk be run, in the effort to suppress
them, of more serious consequences by resort to expedients of
even doubtful constitutionality." 28
In short, what was needed, the Court felt, was a hard and fast
line between the two spheres of power, and in the following series of
propositions it endeavored to lay down such a line: (1) production is
always local, and under the exclusive domain of the states; (2) com-
merce among the states does not commence until goods "commence
their final movement from their States of origin to that of their destina-
tion"; (3) the sale of a product is merely an incident of its produc-
tion and, while capable of "bringing the operation of commerce into
play," affects it only incidentally; (4) such restraint as would reach
commerce, as above defined, in consequence of combinations to con-
trol production "in all its forms," would be "indirect, however in-
evitable and whatever its extent," and as such beyond the purview of
the statute.29
26. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). The late
Charles Beard charged Marshall with a certain responsibility for the doctrine of
freedom of contract on the score of his assigning such a transcendental value to the
inviolability of contracts in his dissenting opinion in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 212, 331 (1827). This inviolability is derived from the proposition that
"the right to contract is the attribute of a free agent. . . ." Id. at 350. Ogden v.
Saunders is the one and only constitutional case in which Marshall appeared in the
minority.
27. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
28. Id. at 13.
29. Id. at 13-16.
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In the Sugar Trust case nullification of the legislation involved
assumed, therefore, the guise-or disguise-of statutory construction.
A generation later, in the first Child Labor case,a" the Court invalidated
outright an act of Congress which banned from interstate commerce
goods from factories in which child labor had been employed. Said
Justice Day for a sharply divided Court:
"In interpreting the Constitution it must never be forgotten
that the Nation is made up of States to which are entrusted the
powers of local government. And to them and to the people the
powers not expressly delegated to the National Government are
reserved. Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76. The power
of the States to regulate their purely internal affairs by such laws
as seem wise to the local authority is inherent and has never been
surrendered to the general government. New York v. Miln, 11
Pet. 102, 139. . . . To sustain this statute would not be in our
judgment a recognition of the lawful exertion of congressional
authority over interstate commerce, but would sanction an in-
vasion by the federal power of the control of a matter purely local
in its character, and over which no authority has been delegated
to Congress in conferring the power to regulate commerce among
the States." "'
In short, the Court bases its decision on the tenth amendment,
having first taken the precaution to amend the same by inserting the
word "expressly" in front of the word "delegated."
And in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.' decided in 1935, the Court held
void on like grounds an act of Congress intended to regulate hours of
labor and wages in the bituminous coal mines of the country. Said
Justice Sutherland for the Court:
" . [T]he conclusive answer [to defense of the act] is
that the evils are all local evils over which the federal government
has no legislative control. The relation of employer and em-
ployee is a local relation. At common law, it is one of the do-
mestic relations. The wages are paid for the doing of local
work. Working conditions are obviously local conditions. The
employees are not engaged in or about commerce, but exclusively
in producing a commodity. And the controversies and evils,
which it is the object of the act to regulate and minimize, are
local controversies and evils affecting local work undertaken to
accomplish that local result. Such effect as they may have upon
commerce, however extensive it may be, is secondary and indirect.
An increase in the greatness of the effect adds to its importance.
It does not alter its character." '
30. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
31. Id. at 275-76.
32. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
33. Id. at 308-09.
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In brief, the distinction between direct and indirect effects is not one
of degree but one of kind; and its maintenance is essential to the
maintenance of the federal system itself.3
Thanks to the Great Depression-Andr6 Siegfried has recently
pronounced it "probably the most important event in the history of
the United States since the War of Independence"-this entire system
of constitutional interpretation touching the federal relationship is
today in ruins. It began to topple in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.,35 in which the Wagner Labor Act was sustained. This was
in 1937, while the "Old Court" was still sitting. In 1941, in United
States v. Darby,"8 the "New Court" completed the job of demolition.
The act of Congress involved was the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, which not only bans interstate commerce in goods produced
Under substandard conditions, but makes their production a penal of-
fense against the United States if they are "intended" for interstate
or foreign commerce. Here Chief Justice Stone, speaking for the
unanimous Court, goes straight back to Marshall's definition of Con-
gress' power over interstate commerce in Gibbons v. Ogden and to
his construction of the "necessary and proper" clause in McCulloch
v. Maryland. The former is held to sustain the power exercised in
the Fair Labor Standards Act by way of prohibiting commerce; the
latter is held to support the prohibition by the act of the manufacture
of goods for interstate commerce except in conformity with the stand-
ards imposed by the act as to wages and hours. As to the tenth amend-
ment, it was dismissed "as a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered." Its addition to the Constitution altered the latter
in nowise.Y
Summing up the effects of the Darby case, the late Justice Roberts
said in his Holmes Lectures for 1951: "Of course, the effect of sus-
taining the Act was to place the whole matter of wages and hours of
persons employed throughout the United States, with slight excep-
tions, under a single federal regulatory scheme and in this way com-
pletely to supersede state exercise of the police power in this field." "8
All in all, it is not extravagant to say that the Supreme Court
has rarely, if ever, rendered a more revolutionary decision, whether
34. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935).
The spokesman for the Court in Schechter was Chief Justice Hughes, as he was two
years later in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. In PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES
(1951), the author endeavors to show that his hero's route from the one position to
the other proceeded in a perfectly straight line without any backtracking. The demon-
stration is far from conclusive. See Corwin, Book Review, 46 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
1167, 1171-72 (1952).
35. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
36. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
37. See id. at 113-15, 118, 123-24.
38. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 56 (1951).
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it be judged for its advance over contemporary constitutional doc-
trine, or for its immediate legislative consequences, or for its implica-
tions for future national policy. And in the end it is Marshall's two
great opinions which supply its underlying ideology. The great Chief
Justice, embodied, or embalmed, in pronouncements still vital, speaks
again, becomes once more the Revolutionist. Can it be supposed that
if he had been present in person he would have consented willingly
to be thus conscripted in the service of the New Deal? Self-exhumation
of the illustrious dead is an accepted literary convention, and I claim the
right to invoke it on this occasion. If the right be granted, then the
answer to the above question must undoubtedly be "No." For support-
ing testimony I turn once more to Beveridge, for his account of the
strenuous and successful fight which Marshall, with the cooperation of
his critic Madison, made in the Virginia constitutional convention of
1829 against manhood suffrage and in support of the oligarchic county
court system. As Beveridge phrases the matter:
"On every issue over which the factions of this convention
fought, Marshall was reactionary and employed all his skill to de-
feat, whenever possible, the plans and purposes of the radicals. In
pursuing this course he brought to bear the power of his now im-
mense reputation for wisdom and justice. Perhaps no other phase
of his life displays more strikingly his intense conservatism." "
"The American Nation," Beveridge adds, "was his dream; and to the
realization of it he consecrated his life." 4o At no time, on the other
hand, did he contemplate the desirability, or even the feasibility, in a
free state, of greatly altering by political action the existing relations
of the component elements of society. Liberty, the spacious liberty
of an expanding nation, not social equality, was the lode-star of his.
political philosophy.
39. 4 BEvERDmGE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 488.
40. Id. at 472.
